






RESEARCH SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Department of Economics
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1220
SEMINAR DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 224
PRODUCTION EFFECTS OF PRICE- AND COST-BASED






General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
July 1988
*We are grateful to Robert M. Stern for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Financial assistance was provided by the Ford Foundation in support of a
program of research in trade policy at The University of Michigan.
Address correspondence to:
Professor Michael P. Leidy
Department of Economics
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
JAN 2 / 1989
The Sumner and
Laura Fo~Aer Library_




Dumping is defined in Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) as offering a product for sale in export markets at a price below "normal" value.
Normal or "fair" value usually is defined as the price charged by a firm in its home market.
In the absence of a domestic price (a home market), the highest comparable price charged
in third markets or the exporting firm's estimated costs of production may be used to deter-
mine normal value.1 As a precondition for imposing protection, The GATT Anti-Dumping
Code requires not only that dumping be established by an investigating authority, but also
that a domestic industry be materially injured, or face the threat of material injury, and
that this injury be caused by imports.
Many nations have passed anti-dumping (AD) legislation, and some are intensive users
of the instrument. As can be seen from Table 1, major users are Australia, Canada, the
European Community, and the United States. It is noteworthy that in the six-year period
covered, over 1200 AD cases were initiated in these countries. Most international economists
would agree that the rationale for an AD law and AD procedures is very weak, probably
nonexistent. However, the economic literature focuses on modelling the reasons that firms
might find it in their interest to dump, and not on the effect of AD laws on trade patterns
and production.2 Indeed, the presence of the threat of an AD action is rarely taken into
account.3 Thus, in our view an important dimension of the real trading environment is
conspicuously absent from the theoretical dumping literature.'
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some of the economic incentives set up by
AD legislation. We focus on the production response of an exporting firm to the threat
of an AD action. The model formalizes one way in which the mere passage of an AD
1 Under the cost criterion e<:onomists generally would define dumping as selling below marginal cost. In prac~titc, pre-
sunmably in sorme piart dlue to the unob~servability of miarginal costs, average cost is specified as the standard. For a brief
introdluctioni to GATT anti-durnping rules, see Stern, Jac~kson. and Hoekmnan (1987) and Finger (1987). For a lengthier
treatment see Caine (1981) or Vernmist (1987).
2 Retcent models designied to explain various motives for dumping intcludle Davies anid Mc:Guiinness (1982), Ethier (1982),
Blair and Cheng (1984), Derhardt (1984). and Hillman and Katz (1986).
3A rec(ent exc:eptioni is webbl (1987) where the efects oif an aniti-dumnpinig law on the lot:ationi of productioni is examuined.
4wlhl several empirical studies have attempted to nieasure the imrpac~t of the threat of an AD at:tion (e.g., Finger (1981),
Fiiiger, Hall and Nelson (1982) and Herander and Schwartz (1984) the model spe<:ifications are somewhat ad hoc, just
loosely grounided in a formal theoretical model.
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law may constitute "harassment" of foreign firms, harassment that may have a chilling
effect on trade similar to other protectionist measures.' The existence of AD laws and the
concomitant threat of an AD action will cause exporting firms to alter their production
and allocation decisions. We show that the exporting firm's reaction to AD laws differs
depending on whether a price- or a cost-based definition of dumping is used. In practice it
is often uncertain which procedure will be followed, thus making things more difficult for
the exporter. The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 sets out the model, Section
3 addresses production responses in the short run, while Section 4 analyzes longer run
production responses under alternative market structures. We investigate the behavior of
the firm under three types of AD rules: price-based, marginal cost based, and average cost
based. While in practice a marginal cost criterion never is used, analysis of this case is,
nevertheless, interesting and useful. It is useful because selling below marginal cost probably
is the only case where dumping could be construed as predatory. Further, by examining
the incentives set up by a marginal cost-based AD threat our understanding of the effects
of price- and average cost based rules is enhanced. It is of interest, therefore, to investigate
what the effect of a marginal cost rule would be.
2. THE MODEL
In order to examine the effects of AD laws we need a model of the firm that generates
dumping. We choose one where a floating exchange rate generates uncertainty with respect
to the value (in home currency) of exports. Thus, we model dumping as a random event.
An unexpectedly strong domestic currency tends to bring on AD actions.6 To focus the
investigation on the role of price-based versus cost-based AD laws, as well as on the signif-
icance of market structure at home and abroad, we assume the firm is risk neutral. This
5The harassnment hypothesis appears to be due to Gregory (1981) and Finiger (1981). Finger (1981, p. 264) makes two
points: (1) AD laws proscrib~e actions by foreign firmis that are allowed under laws governing domestic trade practices;
and (2) the costly process of an AD investigation may serve as an import barrier. Finger hypothesizes that the c:ost
of dlealing with an AD investigation is higher for foreign firms, and thus that the threat of an action may constitute
harassment of foreign competition. Harassment is niot clearly defined in the literature, and one of tihe goals of this paper
is to make this intuitive notion more co~ncrete.
6 Currency fluctuations have been found to be positively <:orrelated with the number of AD investigations initiated (Dit:key,
1982). The kind ouf dlumping we nmodel is <:cnsistent with what Viner callecd "sporadic" dumping. We choose this model
of dummping both for convenienc:e andl because it allows uis to abstract from strategic <:onisiderationms. Inideed, sporadic
cdumpinig is sinigled out specifically ini Artic:le II(ii)(b) of thme GATT Anti-Dumpinmg Code as particumlarly injurioums. Dale
(1980) points out that thme first U.S. anmti-dmumpinmg law (set:tions 80)0-1 of thme Revenue Act of 1916) was direc:tecd against
predatory dumping exclusively. However, because of the difficulty in establishing predatory intent subsequent legislation
includes no mention of the possible motives of the dumper. Henc:e, allegations of predation need be no part of an aiti-
dumnping action.
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approach enables us to separate the potentially confounding influence of varying attitudes
toward risk from other important determinants of the firm's response to AD legislation. It
is assumed that during the market period (ex post) there is no opportunity to reallocate
product between markets. To be able to ignore optimal inventory considerations the prod-
uct is assumed perishable. We also ignore incentives to relocate production facilities across
sealed markets.
Following Katz et al. (1982) consider a firm selling in two separate markets: home
and abroad. The firm faces a nonstochastic demand function in both markets. However,
there exists uncertainty due to a flexible exchange rate. The firm must select its level of
production and the allocation of product across markets prior to the resolution of exchange-
rate uncertainty. Given stable demand in both markets, foreign and domestic prices are
known ex ante. What is not known is the domestic currency translation of the foreign price.
Under a price-based definition of dumping, if the bilateral exchange rate (the domestic
currency price of foreign exchange) realizes sufficiently low (indicating a relatively strong
domestic currency) the domestic currency translation of the foreign price will be below
the domestic price.7 We assume that this triggers an anti-dumping investigation and the
imposition of (provisional) measures with certainty.8 An AD action is modeled in the
following way. When an AD investigation is triggered the foreign authorities impose an
AD duty or otherwise force the firm to remove the dumping margin (i.e., to establish price
parity with the home market). We model this as obliging the firm to withdraw sufficient
product from the foreign market to remove the dumping margin. 9
we will address the effects of a cost-based rule later.
In prin:iple, imposition of protection requires a joint showing of less-than-fair-value (LTFV) pricing and material injury.
or the threat of such injury. Imposition of protection is therefore uncertain even given a LTFV finding. Caine (1981,
pp. 703 707) has argued that, especially in the U.S., once LTFV has been established only a miniral showing of injury
may be required. While this may be too strong a <:oncluhsion, it is supported b~y the fatct that in the U.S. froni 1982
through 1985 of 234 completed pirelimuinary injury investigations, 204 extended an affirmative finiding (Destler 1986,
applendlix D33). Even under a more stringent injury standard the analysis in this paper would not be altered, except to
the extent that the foreign firm will not react as strongly. we are comfortable with this assumption both because we
want to focus on theoretical effects and because pirovisional measures may be takeni quickly and relatively easily. As
argued elsewhere, provisional measures may have the same effe<:t as a finial duty (Vermnulst, 1987). It should be pointed
out also that the earliest anti-dumping statute (Canada. 1904: see Dale (1981. p. 12)) was invoked "automatic:ally"
in the sense that injury did not have to be p~roved. Finally, while we do not address this issue, a c:lear rent-seeking
in(:entive exists for import-:ompJeting firrns to take actions that will increase the likelihood of a finding of injury once
LTFV has been estalblished.
9This is done bo0th for <:onvenience and bec:ause it is not unrepiresentative (of the way AD laws work in plractice. GATT
ruh-s allow exporting firnis to undertake to rernove the dlumping margin and thins to avoid an AD duty. The European
Community in particular makes substantial use of these suispensioni agreenments (Vermnulst, 1987).
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For the sake of comparison consider first the behavior of an exporting firm in a world
without AD laws. By assumption the only source of uncertainty is the exchange rate.
Therefore the firms problem is to:1)
max R1(y1) + E(e)R;(y2) - C(y), (1)
where E is the expectation operator, e is the exchange-rate random variable (defined as the
domestic currency price of foreign currency) with known subjective probability distribution,
R1(y 1) = p1(y1)y1 is the home revenue function, R;(y 2) = p;(y2)y2 is the foreign revenue
function in foreign currency units, and C(y) is the cost function in domestic currency units
(y = y1 + y2). The solution, of course, satisfies the condition that output is allocated so
that marginal revenue in the domestic market and expected marginal revenue abroad just
equal marginal cost.
R1(y 1) = C'(y) (2)
E(e)R;'(y2) = C'(y) (3)
How does the existence of a price-based AD law abroad modify the firm's production
and allocation decision? Under a price-based definition of dumping every realization of the
exchange rate such that e p;(y2) < p1(y1) triggers an AD action which results in a mandate
of price equalization across the two markets. That is, the authorities in the export market
force e p2(y 2) = pi(y1), where 92 < y2 and Y2 is the quantity of product sent to the foreign
market ex ante. Observe that 92 is defined by
p1(y1)
y2= y2( ), (4)
where y2(-) is the foreign demand function. For every realization of e in (0,p1(y1)/p;(y2)) an
AD action is invoked. For every realization of e between p1(y1)/p;(y2) and infinity (or some
finite upper bound) the AD constraint is nonbinding ex post. This implies the following
10Note that the nonstochastic cost function does not imply that the firni's inputs are all of domestic origin. The production
detision occurs prior to the market period for output. This imparts uncertainty to the foreign revenue function even
under stable foreign demand. Contemporaneous spot input prices. onl the other hand, are known whether these factors
originate at honie or abroad.
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problem for the firm:
I1 (V1)
max R1 (y1) + R2(y1, e) dF(e) + R2(y 2) e dF(e) - C(y1 + y2), (5)
() ( i)
where F(e) is the firm's subjective distribution function for the future spot exchange rate,
and R2(y1, e) =-p1(y 1 )y 2 ( 1$CJ1)) is the foreign revenue function when the AD constraint is
binding, with y2(-) being the foreign demand function and p1(y1) being the inverse demand
function in the home market. It is assumed that neither the exporting decision nor the AD
action affects the subjective probability distribution of e."
Clearly the existence of AD laws will affect the firm's decision only if at the pre-AD law
optimum the AD constraint is potentially binding. That is, if yi and y; solve (1), the AD
law affects the firm's behavior only if F(e) is strictly positive for some e in (0,p1(yi)/P2(y;)).
If this is not true the firm's problem is unchanged by the introduction of an AD law. From
here on we assume that the AD law is relevant to firm behavior. The necessary conditions
for optimality in the presence of a potentially binding AD law can be written as12
/ R 2 (y 1 ,e)
R'e(y1 ) + J) dF(e) = C'(y), (6)
By1
R;'(y2) e dF(e) = C'(y). (7)
The intuition underlying expressions (6) and (7) is straightforward. Notice that the
marginal revenue associated with an increase in domestic output contains a term not present
in (2). This term reflects the increment to revenue earned by selling each constrained unit
abroad at a somewhat lower price than otherwise, and so at a price somewhat closer to
the unconstrained optimum. That is, by adjusting domestic output the firm can trade off
revenue in the home market against expected revenue abroad in the event of an AD action.
11The firm p~erceive's itse'lf to be e<:onomically small in this sense.
12 Bec~ause the integrands R2(71i, a) = p1(y/1)f2 ( Y~) and R*(W2) are equal at the limit of integration where the AD
law be<:omes binding, the terms involving differentiation of the limits of integration cancel.
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It can be shown that the integrand 8R 2(y1, e)/8y1 is positive for all e in the relevant range
if demand is linear in the foreign market.13 This implies that the firm has an incentive to
exceed the unconstrained optimum in the home market for any given level of production. By
doing so the firm tends to mitigate the damages associated with an ex post AD action as well
as to reduce the probability of a LTFV finding. The exporting firm's capacity to ameliorate
its condition under the AD threat by adjusting domestic supply is the principle characteristic
that distinguishes price-based from average cost based AD laws. This tendency will be
identified as the exporter's home-market effect.
A second independent effect of the price-based AD law is that the expected marginal
revenue in the foreign market declines for any given level of y2. This occurs since the
marginal revenue of y2 is zero over an entire range of possible exchange-rate realizations.
When the AD constraint is binding, ex ante variations in y2 have no effect on the revenue
earned in that market ex post. The firm, therefore, has an incentive to reduce shipments to
the foreign market for any given level of total production and domestic supply. Since the
objective of anti-dumping legislation can only be to protect nascent or established domestic
industries, to the extent that the AD threat induces exporters to recoil from the foreign
market this objective is advanced. Observe, however, that the home-market effect serves to
circumvent rather than to further the objective of protection. To the extent that exporting
firms are able to concentrate their response to the AD threat in the home market, the
13 This c:an b seeu as follows:
R2(71i, e) = P1( i )?12
Hence,
DR 2  ,( P1(7/i) ,F2 ( = i) [2 (P ))2+ P1( i) 2 F i i(i )
sin1ce in the constrained region p(y )/c = p*2- Noe that
dy 2 Y2
is the foreign elasticity of dlernand evaluated at the constrained level of supply y2 = 12(pi(h1)/c). Now sice the
unc:onstrainedl level of foreign supplly must be in the elastic region of foreign demnand and since constrained supply is
less than uinconstrainied. uder linear dlemandi I';*| > 1 in the relevant region of foreign (demnand. And conditional on
the firm having some market power at home (so that p's < 0), this establisheis the clairn. If the firm is a price taker
domestically the in tegrand is simply zero.
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threat, though credible, fails to achieve the desired outcome.
How do things change if cost-based rules are followed? In this case, we assume an
AD action is triggered whenever the exchange-rate adjusted foreign price is below costs of
production. Costs can be defined as average total costs or as marginal costs. In practice,
perhaps in part due to the unobservability of marginal costs, average total costs are taken
as the criterion." In what follows we will examine both possibilities. This is because
analysis of the effect of a rule based on marginal cost is of interest in its own right, and
because the average cost rule is a special case of a marginal cost rule. The analysis based
on the long run average total cost is equivalent to assuming constant marginal cost if the
investigation aims to determine the minimum of the long run average total cost schedule.'5
Thus, an AD action is taken with certainty whenever the exchange-rate adjusted foreign
price realizes below the firm's marginal cost or average total cost, depending on which rule
is being implemented. As before, when an AD action is invoked the firm is required to
adjust foreign price to eliminate the dumping margin.
Consider a marginal cost AD law first. If ep;(y2) < C'(y) an anti-dumping action is
taken. This forces the firm to achieve ep2(p2 ) = C'(y), where 92 < y2. The firm's expected
profit maximization problem is:
4 ( se ) oo
max R1(y1) + R 2(y, e) dF(e) + Ri(y 2)J edF(e) - C(y), (8)
where
C'(y)
R2(y, e) = y2 .-eC'(y). (9)
14 U.s. law speaks of fully allocate~d coata of production.
15It should be nioted that. ini (:ontrast to the pri<:e-b~asedl definition, a violation of a cost-based AD law is not readily
observable by the foreign authorities. In what follows we make the (heroic) assumption that the firm's cost schedules
can b~e observed.
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It can be shown that' 6
ok2
= C"(y) - 92 - (1 + - ), (10)
ay
where y2 Y= 2( C(Y)) is the constrained foreign supply given an AD action and y- is the
foreign elasticity of demand at 92 < Y2. If the foreign demand curve is linear the foreign
elasticity of demand at y 2 must be such that 1j*| > 1. This is true since 92 < Y2 and the
firm's ex ante foreign supply must be in a region of elastic demand. Hence, we see that for
any realization of e in the lower range the following must be true:
aR2 > 0, if C" <0;
= 0, if C" =0; (11)
ay < 0, if C" > 0.
The first-order conditions for (8) are:17
/,BR2(y, e),
R((y1) + ' dF(e) = C'(y) (12)
ay
d ( u
r() ocf &R2 (y, e) dF(e) + R ](y) e dF(e) = C'(y). (13)
The integral expression common to (12) and (13) indicates that the firm's marginal
revenue in each market depends on the sensitivity of marginal cost to variations in output.
Adjusting output affects marginal revenue through the marginal-cost channel by altering
the (subjective) probability that an AD action will be taken and by affecting the price to be
imposed in the foreign market should an AD action occur. If C' < 0, the same qualitative
effect pertains as under a price-based law.' 8 Note that if, as in practice, an average cost
rule is followed, the threshold at which the AD-constraint becomes binding is independent
of the firm's level of production. Even so, output for the foreign market must fall. This can
16 Differentiating (9) with respect to yj yields:
DR2(y. rc) =, C" d+ C C
oi * dp* c
= C"y 2(1 + r/*)
sinc(e C' /c = p*2 undler the AD conlstrainlt.
17 As in the price-based problern, the derivatives involving the limits of integration cancel.
18 If C" = () (constant MC), the passage of c:ost-based AD legislation abroad affects firrn behavior ini a rnanner analogous
to a downward adjustrnent in exchange-rate expectations.
8
be demonstrated as follows. Assuming the firm has market power at home and abroad (the
textbook case), prior to the imposition of the AD law the firm allocates output to satisfy
expressions (2) and (3). With C" = 0 the first-order conditions after the imposition of a
cost-based AD law are:19
R1(y1 ) = C' (14)
R2'(y;) J edF(e) = C'. (15)
C'/p*(y* )
Since C' is constant, y1 is unchanged by the AD law. The home market is, in this sense,
insulated from the foreign AD law. However, there is a tendency for the quantity supplied
to the foreign market to fall. As long as the pre-AD law optimum is such that the subjective
probability density function of E has some density below C'/p;(y;), we know that
J e dF(e) < E(e). (16)
C'/p;(y, )
Hence, at the pre-AD law optimal value of the foreign allocation, y2, we have
R;'(y;) J edF(e) - C' < 0. (17)
Thus, y; overshoots the post-AD law optimum. Under constant marginal cost, therefore,
the firm's output falls by the full amount of its reduced shipments to the foreign market
and supply to the exporter's home market is unaffected. While the exporter's home market
is not directly affected under these circumstances, important general equilibrium effects are
suggested. Since production declines for every representative exporting firm, the threat of
AD actions may have a significant contractionary effect on the exporter's macroeconomy.
Although such conclusions are formally outside the scope of the present model, this conjec-
ture is consistent with the reduction in the gains from trade following the erection of other,
more traditional, barriers to trade observed in neoclassical trade models.
An AD law based on the firm's minimum long-run average total cost (LRATC) is
equivalent to a marginal-cost based law only under constant costs. The problem of a firm
19 See e!quations$ (12) and (13) and the prior dlist:uasion involving the sign of ON/&y.
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facing a minimum-LRATC-based AD law is to solve:
C/p* (y2) o
max R1(yi) + R2(C, e) dF(e) + R2(y 2)J edF(e) - C(y1 + y2), (18)
yi1y2
() C/p2(y2)
where R22(C, e) C y2(C/e) is the foreign revenue function when the AD constraint is
binding, and C is the minimum LRATC. The solution of (18) satisfies2t
R'(y1) = C'(y), (19)
R;'(y2) e dF(e) = C'(y). (20)
C/p (y2)
Observe that the first-order conditions here are equivalent to (14) and (15) if, and only if,
marginal cost is constant. Otherwise, the exporter's home market is affected indirectly by
the imposition of the cost-based AD law. In particular, while production falls, supply at
home increases if R" < 0 and C" > 0. This is shown in Figure 1.
The curve labeled #1 in Figure 1 indicates combinations of y1 and y2 that satisfy
equation (2). That labeled #2 denotes combinations of y1 and y2 that satisfy equation
#3. Point A shows the pre-AD law equilibrium production and allocation values for yi
and y2. The imposition of an AD law based on the minimum LRATC has no effect on the
position of the #1 curve since equations (2) and (19) are identical. However, expression
(20) indicates that the imposition of the AD law reduces the marginal revenue associated
with y2. Equation (20) can be satisfied only if the value of y1 is reduced for any given
level of y2. That is, the curve representing values of y1 and y2 that satisfy (20) must be
everywhere to the left of the #2 curve. The leftward shift, of course, will not in general be
parallel. The AD-law equilibrium is at point B, where production has declined, domestic
output has increased and exports have declined by more than domestic output has risen.
In the rest of the paper we continue to focus on the output response of the exporting
firm. As this is unclear in general, a number of special cases are investigated. The definition
of dumping and the role of market structure at home and abroad are crucial to determining
20 Agithe terrns) involving differentiation of the~ limnits of integration cantcel, and the partials of !R2 with respect to y1
and y/2 are bo0th zero.
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the firm's response to an AD constraint. We will proceed by examining first the production
response in the short run.
3. PRODUCTION RESPONSE IN THE SHORT RUN
Suppose that a foreign AD law is imposed abruptly (with surprise) at a time when prod-
uct has been shipped abroad, but there is still opportunity to adjust the level of production
upward. That is, the AD law is imposed prior to the market period. As the quantity of
product shipped to the foreign market is perceived to be sunk, the firm's only intra-period
ex ante control variable is the quantity of product to be offered in the home market.2 1
We continue to treat the firm's cost function as depending on total output for the
period. 22 It is assumed that there is no updating of the subjective distribution of e as
the market period approaches. This means that a firm not anticipating impending AD
legislation has no incentive to postpone the production decision and may need to make this
decision at the beginning of the period in order to make its foreign shipments. Under these
conditions the firm's intra-period (or short-run) response to the surprise passage of an AD
law abroad can only involve changing its output for the home market. In this sense, the
home-market effect is isolated and it alone drives the results.
Prior to the AD law the firm will have chosen production and allocated output to
satisfy equations (2) and (3). Say that yi and y; solve the original problem. The firm's
intra-period problem after the surprise adoption abroad of a price-based AD law is:
I;g( ioo
max R1(y1) - C(y1 + y2) + R2 (y 1, e) dF(e) + R*(y') e dF(e). (21)
7/1>_?/1 ~~ 2\Y2J1 e F1) (1
The firm's updated production and home-supply response is determined by
R'1(y1) + J'R(,e dF(e) = C'(y1, + yi). (22)
£91
21 The anlalysis is the sarne if instead of passing a new AD law, existing legislation that had been unlenfor:edl is niow
perc~eived to be binding.
22 Strictly speaking, in order for the c:ost functioni to remnain <:onstant intra-period we require stable input pritces. This is
no0 problern if the firrn purc:hases its inputs dornestically. Whlile~ this assuinption is not required in the analysis of other
sections, in the the short-run investigation of this set:tion we (10 assurne that inputs are supplied dorniestically.
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But, as shown previously R 2(y1, e)/ay1 > 0 for all e in (O,p1(y1)/p;(y;)). This implies that
at the pre-shock levels (yi, y;) the marginal revenue of domestic supply exceeds the marginal
cost. The firm, therefore, acts to increase production for the home market. By doing so
the domestic price that will prevail in the market period is driven down. Increasing supply
in the home market improves the firm's position in two ways. It reduces the probability
that an AD action will be taken by lowering the threshold at which price-based dumping
occurs. It also reduces the quantity of product that must be pulled from the foreign market
(and consequently perishes) in the event of an AD action. Thus, the surprise imposition
of a price-based AD law, or alternatively any change in the political environment that
reveals existing legislation will now be enforced, induces the exporting firm in the short run
to increase production and to "dump" it in the home market. This perverse production
response is a stopgap measure that lasts only until the end of the period. It is identified as
preemptive home dumping.
Now suppose the firm faces a cost-based definition of dumping. Then the adjustment
taken above may be inappropriate. Above, the idea was to increase output in the home
market to drive down the domestic price. This lowered the likelihood of an AD action
being taken and, if taken, allowed greater sales abroad than otherwise. Under a cost-based
AD rule, this same firm with everywhere increasing marginal cost would actually like to
decrease output. If it were possible to do so the applicable level of marginal cost could be
reduced. But the production level cannot be reduced (production has already occurred),
it can only increase intra-period. When the firm's marginal cost is everywhere falling, the
optimal response is to step up production beyond the pre-AD law optimum in order to
reduce the applicable level of marginal cost. Thus the response under declining marginal
cost is quite analogous to the price-based example above. Increasing production has the
effect of reducing the probability of an AD action as well as reducing the quantity of product
that must be withdrawn from the foreign market when an AD action is triggered.
To see this consider again the first-order conditions in the absence of an AD law given
by (2) and (3). With the passage of a marginal cost-based AD law the intra-period problem
12
confronting the firm is:
2( x) c
max R1(y1) + J R2 (y, e) dF(e) + R;(y;) e dF(e) - C(yi + yi). (23)
(((
12 (1,0
Domestic output is chosen to satisfy
/CBR2(y e)
R'1(y1 ) + J'8ye) dF(e) - C'(y1 + y2) <0. (24)
Note that y1 = yi satisfies (2) so that R '(yi) = C'(yi + y;). If C" > 0 everywhere, then the
integrand in (24) is nonpositive for all e and the condition in (24) is met at y1 = yi. In fact,
under nondecreasing marginal costs the firm would like to be able to reduce production
below the previously set level but cannot since this amount is sunk. If instead marginal
cost is everywhere decreasing, then the integrand in (24) is positive for all e indicating that
(24) fails at the pre-AD law solution. The firm should increase output and, by so doing,
reduce the marginal cost of production.
Hence, if C" > 0, the intra-period response is to do nothing. If instead C" < 0,
stepping up production and driving down marginal cost can mitigate the expected damages
associated with the new AD law. Observe that an AD law expressed in terms of the
minimum long-run average total cost leaves the firm powerless to affect the dumping margin
by adjusting domestic output. The optimal short-run response is again to do nothing.
Under an average cost AD rule the home market effect is always absent. This leaves the
firm without an instrument to lessen its exposure to the AD threat in the short run.
4. LONG RUN PRODUCTION RESPONSES: SPECIAL CASES
4.1 No Domestic Market
At times a firm produces entirely for export, with no domestic market for its good.
Assuming no third market data exist, a firm producing exclusively for export only can be
subject to a cost-based AD law. Assume that an AD action is taken against the firm if it
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is found to be selling in the foreign market below its marginal cost of production. Prior
to the imposition of the AD law the firm chooses production to equate expected marginal
revenue and marginal cost. The passage of a cost-based AD law modifies the firm's output
decision as follows:
c'(y)/P2(y) oc
max J (y,e)dF(e)+IR(y) J edF(e) -- C(y). (25)
c ~C'(?)/P2;(y)
The post-AD law production decision satisfies:
C'(y)/p -(y) -oCg
J R(y, e) dF(e) + R'(y) / edF(e) = C'(y) (26)
C'(y)/p;( 1 )
As mentioned previously, the sign of the integrand 9H/By depends on whether marginal
cost is increasing, decreasing, or constant. If C" > 0 then 8R/&y < 0 for all y and e.
Everywhere nondecreasing marginal cost is sufficient to conclude that the firm will reduce
output in response to the imposition of a cost-based AD law. That is, at the pre-AD law
optimum, y-, we know that
c'(y*)/r2(y*) - oo
BR)y, e) dF(e) + RZ'(y*) e dF(e) - C'(y) < 0 (27)
c ~C' (y*') /P2 (*)
as long as marginal cost is everywhere nondecreasing. By reducing production the proba-
bility of an AD action being taken falls and, if taken, the mandated product withdrawal is
not as great as it would have been otherwise. If marginal cost declines sharply as output is
reduced below y- then the required downward adjustment will be quite small. Under such
circumstances the firm is able to adapt to the AD law with minimal effect on price in the
foreign market. The adjustment is manifested principally in a decline in the firm's marginal
cost of production rather than in a sharp increase in foreign price. If a firm's marginal costs
rise sharply in a neighborhood of the pre-AD optimum, therefore, the AD law does little to
protect import-competing firms in the foreign market.
Suppose instead that the firm operates under declining marginal costs. The integrand
aN/8y is then positive for all e and y. Declining marginal costs seems to open up the
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possibility that output can expand in response to the AD law. In particular, if under some
circumstances it can occur that
c l I'( {;(*) -C'( I* )/P; (y*)J RIyJe)dF(e) > R'(y) J edF(e), (28)
then the optimal response is to increase production. It is clear that this condition cannot be
satisfied if marginal cost is declining just slightly. Further, sharply decreasing marginal cost
is ruled out by the pre-AD law second-order conditions. Although it is not clear whether
this restriction on the rate of decline in MC is sufficient to rule out an optimal expansion of
output, it appears that under declining marginal cost the incentive to cut back production
is diminished and, if a production cut back is called for, the extent of the reduction will be
less than had marginal cost not been declining. As production is cut back, following the
desired reduction in shipments to the foreign market, this has the countervailing effect of
driving up marginal cost. Other things equal, higher MC increases the firm's exposure to
the AD threat. Hence the effectiveness of pulling product from the foreign market in order
to lessen the AD threat by driving up the export price is partially defeated by the increase
in marginal cost that accompanies a decline in production when the MC curve is negatively
sloped. When marginal cost is rising, on the other hand, a decline in production reinforces
the desirable effect of shifting away from the foreign market.
4.2 Domestic Market Power and Perfect Competition Abroad
Under a price-based definition of dumping and perfect competition in the foreign mar-
ket, prices abroad cannot be affected by an AD action. In the face of an AD action the
exporting firm has no choice but to withdraw entirely from the foreign market ex post.
23
That is, the exporter earns revenue for product shipped abroad only if dumping does not
occur.2 4  Prior to the imposition of the AD law the firn chooses total output to equate
23 we reahiz~e that using AD legislation if there exists perfect :ornpJetition in the irrip)ortinig rnarket is rnanifestly irrational
on the part of the irunosing regie. Nevertheless, as an exert:ise it has independent analytic:al value. and leads to sorne
useful insights regarding the effe<:ts of an AD law.
24 The firnn's problern in this c:ase is to:
ruax R1(y,) + P'?2 J e dP(c) - COy1 + 1)2).
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p;E(e) with marginal cost. The optimal allocation of output is then established by choos-
ing domestic output so that R'1(y1) = C'(y). Figure 2 shows the pre-AD law combinations
of y1 and Y2 satisfying
R'(y1) = C'(y) (29)
and
p;E(e) = C'(y), (30)
in the curves labeled #1 and #2 respectively. Observe that the slope of the #2 curve is
negative one while the slope of the #1 curve is less than one in absolute value.25
The existence of price-based AD legislation implies the following first-order conditions
for the firm:
- e(yip)py2 f(e) = C'(y) (31)Ry1
p / e dF(e) = C'(y). (32)
where e(yi,p;) p 1 (y 1 )/p; is the threshold exchange rate at which the AD law will be just
binding. The middle element in expression (31) is negative. This term reflects the marginal
value of y1 due to the diminished likelihood that an AD action will be taken as increases in
y1 depress the domestic price. This indicates that any combination of yi and Y2 satisfying
(29) leaves (31) strictly positive. The locus of points in (yr, y2) space satisfying (31) must,
therefore, be everywhere to the right of the #1 curve in Figure 2.26 Still assuming the
AD law is perceived to be potentially binding, we observe that any combination of y1 and
y2 satisfying (30) leaves (32) strictly negative. The locus of points satisfying (32) must,
therefore, be everywhere to the left of the #2 curve in Figure 2. The post AD optimum
is, then, to the left of the #2 locus. Because the slope of the #2 locus is minus one we
know that total output must fall. Further, there will tend to be a rather forceful shift of
remaining production toward the home market.
25 c7 1  ' , and C" > U isi required by the second-order <:()nditionls. Hentce -1 < C," < 0. And =
-C\"= -1.
26 Thi assumes e(yi,71 p212(c:) i s well-b~ehaved in the sense that the~ objctiv(e function is concave.
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4.3 Perfect Competition at Home, Market Power Abroad
In this section the firm is assumed to be facing perfect competition in the home market,
but to have exclusive access to a foreign market in which it can exercise market power.27
In the absence of an AD law the firm allocates output so that the price in the domestic
market is just equal to the expected marginal revenue abroad. When facing a price-based
AD law the firm optimizes over yi and Y2 according to:
i /v; ( P2) oc
maxpiyi + pI y2( ) dF(e)+ R(y2) e dF(e) - C(y). (33)
p1/P;(12)
The first-order conditions are:
Pi= C'(y) (34)
RG'(y 2) J edF(e) = C'(y). (35)
pi/P;(n;)
The firm's optimal response to the imposition of a price-based AD law is indicated in
Figure 3.28 The #1 curve represents combinations of y1 and Y2 that solve pi = C'(y). It is a
line whose slope is negative one. This implies that total production is constant along the #1
curve. The #2 curve represents combinations of y1 and y2 that solve R;'(y2)E(e) = C'(y).
Its slope is necessarily less than negative one. The post-AD law first-order conditions
indicate that the #1 curve is unchanged and that the #2 curve is everywhere to the left of the
pre-AD law #2 curve. Together these imply that Ay = 0, with Ay1 > 0 and Dy2 = -Ayi.
The firm's optimal level of production is, therefore, unaffected by the imposition of an AD
law. Only the allocation of output across markets is changed.
The existence of a domestic competitive market establishes an optimal level of pro-
duction irrespective of market conditions abroad, as long as the AD law is price based.29
27 This could be due to the need to acquire an export license, for example.
28 Note that the intra-period response of this firm is y= 0. This occurs since a change in domestic output effe:ts
nieither the probability of dumping nor the the c:ost of an AD action should it be taken. This derives, of course, from
the inability of the firm to affec~t the home price. whic:h eliminates any <:ontrol it might have otherwise had over the
likelihood of an AD action. The homeu market effect is absent unless the exporter has sorne market power domestic~ally.
29 That the tendency to recoil fromi the foreign market in favor of the domestic market has no effect on domestic pri<:e
is a function of assuming that just one firm is affected by the AD law. Of course, if many of these competitive firms
have at:c:ess to separate foreign markets, then a simultaneous (perhaps a <:oordinated) move to impose pric~e-based AD
legislation in ea(:hl of these foreign markets may tend to depress the domestic pric~e as these firms all realhxcate product
to the home rmarket. Such a pri(:e effet:t would then lead to reduced output. This seems rather unlikely, however.
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Under a marginal cost-based definition the production incentives set up by AD legislation
are a bit different. In contrast to the price-based case, adjusting total production in such a
way as to reduce marginal cost diminishes the likelihood that an AD action will be taken,
holding y2 constant. It does this by reducing the threshold at which a cost-based AD action
is triggered.
To see this, consider the post-AD law necessary conditions for optimality. Modifying
expression (12) to reflect perfect competition in the home market and reproducing (13) for
convenience we obtain:
/ BR2(y e)
p1 + J ' dF(e) = C'(y) (36)
ay
e ( a ) o
R2 (, e) +R (y2) e dF(e) = C(y)(13)
The analysis is simplified by assuming that C" > 0 for all y. By expression (11) the
integrand &R2 /&y < 0 for all y and e in the interval (0, C'/p;(y2)). The existence of a cost-
based AD law thus imposes a new cost associated with production which is represented by
the integral expression connon to both equations.
The optimal production response is analyzed in Figure 4. The pre-AD law curves are,
of course, identical to those in Figure 3. But expressions (34) and (13) indicate that the
imposition of a cost-based AD law causes both curves to shift leftward. And this implies
that the firm's total production falls.3" Under perfect competition at home, then, a price-
based AD threat leaves total output unchanged because the firm's activity in the home
market has no effect on the dumping threshold. When the rule is MC-based, however,
30 Further, it appears that the p)ossibility of both y1~ and y/2 falling canniot b~e ruled out (as dIrawnl both y, and y12
fall, hut this need not occur). It c:an he demionstratedl. however, that y2 must fali. To see this. first observe that
pi = R*' (y,;)E(e) hy the first-order <:onditions for the pre-AD law problemi. where y* is the quantity allocated to the
foreign market. Further, since the AD constraint is assumed to be binding over some interval of realizations for given
the pre-AD law choic:e (y*, y*), we also know that
R*' (y* ) E(5) > R*'(y*) J c dF(c). (continued next page)
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reducing output below the unthreatened optimum has value since the dumping threshold
depends on the firm's marginal costs.
4.4 Perfect Competition at Home and Abroad
Finally, consider a firm facing both a perfectly competitive domestic and foreign market,
still assuming that these markets are segmented so that ex post price disparities can arise.3 '
Assume that price parity is expected to hold on average by some firms, i.e., that p1 =
E(e)p; (This is just an average version of the Law of One Price). A risk-neutral firm will
be indifferent to the allocation of output between the home and foreign markets prior to
the imposition of AD legislation. Any allocation of total output satisfying p1 = C'(y) is
optimal. The introduction of either a cost-based or a price-based AD law acts, in effect, to
reduce the expected price in the foreign market. If subjective expectations remain such that
pi = E(e)p;, the firm will unambiguously produce exclusively for the home market. The
indeterminacy of the case prior to AD legislation disappears, and an exclusive preference for
the home market emerges. The firm's output is unchanged, continuing to satisfy pi = C'(y).
The razor's edge described here is contingent upon the firm's expectations being con-
sistent with expected price parity. More generally, expectations across firms will be diverse
with some believing pi < E(e)p;, some believing p, > E(e)p;, and some expecting price
parity. Those firms expecting a relatively strong domestic currency (such that pi > E(e)p;)
will produce exclusively for the home market before and after the AD legislation. Other
Also observe that
I r .dF(r) <; E(i) (t)
'( w+ 2)
' ( N2)
for all yi and y2, where the equality holds only if yi and y2 are selected so as to eliminate the subjective possibility of
an AD ac~tion beinig invoked. Finally, note that the first-order :onditions for the post-AD law problern require that
p= R*2'(92 ) e dF(e). (t )
r'2( m')
where y1, and y/2 solve this problern. Then, since R*"(y/2) < () (the mnarginal revenue <:urve is declining), by equation
(1) above we can conclude that this condition can be restored only by reducing y/2 below y; 50 as to increase R*2.
31 Again, we abstrac~t frorn the rationale for invoking AD in this c:ase.
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firms expecting a relatively weak domestic currency (such that Pi < E(e)p2) will produce
exclusively for the foreign market before the AD law. After the AD law is imposed, the
latter firms may redirect output exclusively to the home market, may be moved to indif-
ference concerning the allocation of product, or may continue selling exclusively abroad. In
any case, because the AD law acts to reduce the expected price received for each unit sent
abroad, its passage causes these firms to reduce production, with a lower limit established
by the nonstochastic home price. 32 Hence, if exchange-rate expectations are diverse across
firms the competitive market conditions described here suggest that some firms will tend
to cut back production but may continue selling exclusively abroad. Others may cut back
production to the minimum level established by pi = C'(y) and begin selling exclusively in
the home market. And still other firms (those whose expectations satisfy pi = E(e)p;) will
sell exclusively in the home market with production unchanged. On net, production falls.
These implications are quite consistent with our findings in the case of perfect competi-
tion at home and market power abroad. There we found that production is unchanged with
the imposition of a price-based AD law and that firms will recoil somewhat from the foreign
market. Here, production is unchanged for every firm that was not producing exclusively
for the foreign market prior to the AD legislation.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
Our analysis indicates that the general effect of an AD law as implemented in practice
is to induce foreign firms to recoil (on the margin) from the export market. This is not
surprising. What is interesting is the sensitivity of the firm's production response to the
exact specification of the AD law, as well as to market structure and timing issues. We
discovered that the optimal response to a price-based AD law in the short-run is to increase
production and to "dump" it on the home market, as long as the firm has some domestic
market power. The reason for this preemptive home dumping response is that by stepping
up production for the domestic market the firm can optimally depress the home price and,
32 pi = C' (y*) defines the lower limit of production.
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thereby, mitigate the dumping threat. In a longer-run time frame the tendency is for
production to decline or remain unchanged. Production is unaffected by the imposition of a
price-based AD law if the exporter is a price taker in the home market. Under marginal- or
average-cost based dumping, we found that the exporter's home market is insulated from
AD legislation in the sense that domestic supply remains unchanged if marginal cost is
constant.
It was noted that in many situations the foreign firm may be able to avoid an AD action
by adjusting its home production instrument. This was the case under price-based AD laws
as long as exporting firms exercise some market power at home. The threat of price-based
AD actions in such cases may not have the desired effect as far as import-competing firms
are concerned. After all, an effective threat from the perspective of import-competing firms
is one that induces foreign exporters to recoil sharply from the threatening market. Under
a price-based rule, as pointed out, alternatives to recoiling from the foreign market exist.
By adjusting total output and domestic supply, exporting firms may be able to mitigate the
AD threat while pulling less product from the foreign market than otherwise. This result
was identified as the home market effect.
If a marginal cost rule were to be implemented, the same conclusion would apply under
decreasing marginal costs. By increasing total production the exporting firm is able to lessen
the likelihood of an ex post AD action while also making the consequences of such an action
less severe. Again, pulling product from the foreign market is but one measure available to
an exporting firm under threat of AD actions. Even though of only hypothetical interest, a
marginal-cost based AD law may be suboptimal if the intent of such legislation is to lessen
foreign competition without actually having to undertake AD actions too frequently. As
the issue of predatory behavior (predatory dumping) is most likely to arise for firms found
to be selling below marginal cost, it is of some interest that even a marginal cost-based AD
law may provide little relief from foreign competition in the ex ante sense.
If an average cost rule is followed, foreign firms no longer can mitigate the AD threat
directly by adjusting total output and domestic supply. The home market now is insulated
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from the foreign AD law in the sense that independent variations of supply in the exporter's
home market cannot mitigate the AD threat. Production at home does, however, decline.
Also note that a rule based on the minimum LRATC eliminates the intra-period incentive
to increase output for the home market. The effectiveness of the AD threat is not offset by
a countervailing home market effect under an average cost rule.
Thus, it appears that there exists an incentive for import-competing firms to signal
their preference for AD investigations that use an average cost rule. It would be interesting
to see to what extent data exist that bolster the prediction that, if possible, average-cost
based investigations are chosen by import-competing firms. The effect of average cost-
based AD actions is similar to voluntary export restraint (VER) agreements and safeguard
(escape clause) actions. Similarities and differences are addressed in Hoekman and Leidy
(1988). The general questions are: How do various instruments of contingent protection
affect production and exporting decisions and what incentives face import-competing firms
to seek alternative forms of relief. As argued in Hoekman (1988), in practice AD actions
can be regarded as a substitute for safeguard (escape clause) actions. Also, the threat of an
AD action may be sufficient inducement for an exporter to agree to a VER. This is clearly
another avenue of harassment. In general, we believe that research on the incentive effects
of alternative rules for contingent protection is a fruitful area for further research, both
from a theoretical and a policy perspective.
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TABLE 1
Antidumping Actions by Major Users, 1980-86
Initiating Number Affirmative Negative : Outcome
Country Initiated Determination Determination Pending
Australia 416 1 219 1 175 46
Canada 230 140 88 8
EEC 280 213 74 47
USA 350 195 137 39
Other 12 8 3 2
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